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Abstract
The fundamental approach to improve pilots’ situation awareness would be to reorganise and
restructure the presentation of information to fit pilot’s cognitive model on the flight deck.
This would facilitate pilots’ perception, understanding, and projection hence making it easier
to find the relevant targets. Sixty pilots (30 B-737 pilots; 30 B-777 pilots) participated in this
research to investigate pilots’ situation awareness while interacting with digital displays and
moving pointed needle displays on cabin pressurization system. The results have shown
significant differences on pilots’ perception, understanding and overall situation awareness
between digital display and pointed display on the flight deck. Pilots significantly preferred
the digital design Cabin Pressurization System which is consistent with the proximity
compatibility principle, and the position of the display on the centre instrument panel is easily
accessible to both pilots and does not require large head movements. There are some
recommendations on the cabin pressurization design including the size of outflow valve
position indicator which should be significantly increased to provided saliency of information;
colour coding should be used on cabin altitude and differential pressure indicator to mark
critical cabin altitude; and standard operating procedures shall include cabin altitude and
differential pressure reading by pilot monitoring. The final and completed solution to the issues
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on the cabin pressurization system is to redesign the scattered pointed displays as integrated
digital displays to fit the human-centred principle.
Keywords: Attention Distributions; Cabin Pressurization System; Flight Deck Design; Human-
Computer Interaction; Situation Awareness
1. Introduction
The occurrences of human-computer interaction (HCI) in the flight deck have been
investigated for a long time, but human errors still maintain the highest percentage of
contribution in aviation accidents (Harris, 2011; Schuster & Ochieng, 2014). Following
several accidents involving pilot’s situation awareness (SA) and HCI issues in flight
operations, the Federal Aviation Administration had launched a study to evaluate flight crew
and flight deck automation designs on transport category airplanes (FAA, 1996). Automation
is the predominant mode of commercial aircraft operation today. Flight deck instruments are
presenting not only flight path, environment and aircraft systems but also the information on
automation status and active operating modes. Complex flight deck interfaces, while
potentially more flexible, are also possibly more error prone. The paradigm of interface design
on the flight deck is becoming increasingly important since the interface design of cabin
decompression closely related to fatal accidents in aviation. According to accident statistics
recently, there have been 47 cases of serious loss of cabin pressurization during a period of
more than two decades (Brooks, 1987).
There are lots of accidents linked to cabin pressurization events, the most notorious accident
is the Boeing 737-300 aircraft operated by Helios Airways in 2005. The aircraft departed from
Larnaca, Cyprus at 06:07 for Prague via Athens. The aircraft has been cleared to FL340.
During climb, the crew contacted the Operations Centre reporting a Cooling System and Take-
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off warning problem. Passing 28,900 ft contact with the aircraft ended and thereafter, there
was no response to radio calls. The flight continued to Athens, entered a hold in the vicinity
of the destination and, after running out of fuel, impacted ground at 09:07. The 115 passengers
and 6 crew members on board were fatally injured. The accident investigation report identified
the following issues which contributed to this accident, including pilots unaware of the cabin
pressurization selector in the manual position; non-identification of the warnings and the
reasons for the activation of the warnings (Cabin Altitude Warning Horn, Passenger Oxygen
Masks Deployment indication, Master Caution); incapacitation of the flight crew due to
hypoxia, resulting in the continuation of the flight via the flight management computer and the
autopilot, depletion of the fuel, engine flameout and the impact of the aircraft with the ground
(AAIASB, 2006). The enhancement of a pilot’s situation awareness is becoming a major task
for interfaces designers, automation development engineers, and human factors experts in
different domains of the aviation industry (Li, Zhang, Minh, Cao, & Wang, 2019).
1.1 Cabin Pressurization System Related to Major Accidents
The lower partial pressure of oxygen at altitude reduces the alveolar oxygen tension in the
brain leading to sluggish thinking, loss of SA and consciousness, and ultimately death. Cabin
decompression incidents are not uncommon in aviation with approximately 40-50 rapid
decompression events occurring worldwide annually. Catastrophic decompression due to
structural failure are infrequent, but many incidents which do lead to a rapid rise in cabin
altitude might then develop as fatal accidents (Bason & Yacavone, 1992). Airworthiness
Regulations regarding instruments mainly encompass requirements for what should be
displayed but not how information should be presented. Regulations follow the “system-by-
system” principle, which means that they are not considering the flight deck as an integrated
system. Human factors certification is a process that reconciles the conflicts between the long
established “engineering approach” to design with the human-centred approach to design
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(Stanton, Salmon, Walker, & Jenkins, 2010). The proximity compatibility principle describes
information from several sources, which are integrated as a whole picture. This principle has
specific significance while assessing the status of complex cabin pressurization systems
(Wickens, Hollands, Banbury, & Parasuraman, 2013).
The design of fuselage structure, decompression detection and control panel interface are not
only for maintaining normal cabin pressure and a comfortable flight environment, it is also
closely associated with aviation safety. Pressurization is necessary above certain altitudes to
protect crew and passengers from the risk of hypoxia, altitude sickness, decompression
sickness, and barotrauma. An understanding of human physiological responses and cognitive
information processing can facilitate the development of solutions to eliminate human error in
the processes of human-computer interactions (Chang, Yang, & Hsiao, 2016; Honn, Satterfield,
McCauley, Caldwell, & Dongen, 2016). Human factors experts in the domain of aviation have
defined situation awareness as the process by which the state of awareness is achieved in order
to make timely decision-making in the flight deck (Li, Harris, & Yu, 2008; Sarter & Woods,
1994). To avoid human-computer coordination breakdown in the cockpit, pilots have to
sustain situation awareness by understanding the status of the automatic systems related to the
settings of the cabin pressurization (Funk, Lyall, & Niemczyk, 1997). Being located on right-
hand side of the overhead instrument panel, cabin pressurization on B-737 lacks accessibility
for both pilots. Grether (1949) investigated the errors in three needles altimeter reading, which
were linked to numerous accidents and incidents. The experiment was conducted almost 70
years ago, and the results demonstrated significant differences in error rates between types of
instrument designs. This provides evidence of human factors engineering which aims to
establish the underlying causes of pilot error, in this case the inappropriate design on the flight
deck, rather than the operator at the sharp end (Dekker, 2001; Dekker & Hollnagel, 2004).
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1.2 The Evolution of Human Factors in Aviation
Breakdowns in human–computer interaction (HCI) have been a critical issue in automated
aircraft (Dekker, 2000; Woods & Sarter, 2000). Recent reports from the Aviation Safety
Reporting System (ASRS) administered by National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA) showed that HCI continues to be the substantial risk to aviation safety (NASA, 2015).
The human factor in aviation is a widely researched topic and is involved in 75% of aviation
accidents, which have caused fatalities and devastating economic consequences (FAA, 1996;
Li et al, 2008). Based on Reason’s framework (Reason, 1990 & 1997), the detailed analysis
of the human component intricated in industrial accidents can help to develop effective
prevention strategies by identifying the human information processing and cognitive patterns
underlying many different error types. Furthermore, Reason (2000) has presented a different
view on human error by approaching human error in two ways: operator approach and system
approach. The first one “operator approach” focused on the errors and accidents of the sharp-
end person in the accident chain with labels like “inattentive, unprofessional, forgetful,
irresponsible etc.”. This is a traditional approach and is being replaced by Reason's second
approach called “system approach” which has a starting point that humans are fallible by their
very nature. Human error is regarded as consequence not as a cause, taking into account
human interaction at all levels, as the systems were developed, maintained and operated by
humans (Reason, 1997; Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003; Li & Harris, 2007).
The integrated design based on Proximity Compatibility Principle (Wickens & Carswell,
1995) of Crew Alerting System (CAS) is significantly quicker than the conventional design
on both finding the solutions and the task completion time (Li et al, 2019). Human Factors
engineering is there to improve interface design by understanding operator’s cognitive
processing while interacting with automation systems in the flight deck. These approaches
have greater impact if applied early in the design process, long before hard-coding has begun
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(Stanton & Young, 1999). It is not possible to divide the instrument design from the controls
design in a flight deck because they are both part of the functioning settings where pilots
perform tasks of flight operations. The term interface design will also encompass the specific
procedures and checklists that structure the pilot’s actions in specific phases of flight including
non-normal and emergency procedures (Li et al, 2019). If human-centred concepts are not
adequately integrated into the early stages of flight deck design, that might then trigger
accidents in future flight operations. A human-centred approach has not been adequately
examined in designing the three needles altimeter and cabin pressurization displays which is
composed of different instruments located on different panels, requiring head/sight re-
positioning, and which divert attention from primary flight instruments (Nikolic, Orr & Sarter,
2004).
1.3 Flight Deck Design and Situation Awareness
The fundamental approach to improve pilots’ situation awareness would be to reorganise and
restructure the presentation of information to fit pilot’s cognitive model on the flight deck.
This would facilitate pilots’ perception and understanding, and projection hence making it
easier to find the relevant targets. Lack of SA is a primary causal factor of human errors in
aviation. Pilots’ SA can be assessed by Situation Awareness Rating Technique as a subjective
tool (Taylor, 1990), and visual parameters can serve as objective indicators (Dijk, Merwe, &
Zon, 2011). Situation awareness could be further divided in three components: spatial
awareness, system awareness and task awareness. Each of these components involves pilot
interaction with the systems in the flight deck, such as spatial awareness with flight
instruments and displays; system awareness with automation and aircraft systems; and task
awareness for attention and task management (Wickens, 2002). According to Endsley’s
framework (1995a), Level 1 of SA starts with perception of relevant information. It evolves
to Level 2 of SA where operator starts to integrate various elements of data related to
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operational goals. This initial perception and then understanding the situations in highly
dynamic operational environments will facilitate pilot’s SA (level 3) to project future status to
make appropriate in-flight decisions.
Björklund, Alfredson and Dekker (2006) found that flight crews used a variety of strategies to
keep track of the status on the instruments related to automation in order to maintain situation
awareness. The primary objective of instrument design is to enhance flight crew’s situation
awareness performance in all aspects of flight operations: awareness of aircraft system status,
the flight path, aircraft configuration and operational environment (Endsley, 1995b). However,
there are many arguments regarding the ‘construction of situational awareness’ and the
‘meaning of loss of situational awareness’ in the domain of human performance (Dekker &
Hollnagel, 2004; Stanton et al, 2006; Stanton et al, 2017). Endsley (2015a) proposed that those
disagreements have evolved probably because of a misconception and misunderstandings of
the model of SA. Therefore, there is a continuing demand to conduct objective research on the
models of SA. In order to improve pilot’s performance on human-computer interactions in
the flight deck, current research focusses on investigating pilots’ situation awareness while
they interact with digital displays of cabin pressurization system on B777 and pointed displays
of cabin pressurization system on B737. This research aims to assess (1) pilots’ perception
while interacting with traditional pointed design (B-737) and digital design (B-777) on cabin
pressurization systems; (2) pilots’ understanding while interacting with different interfaces (B-
737 vs B-777) on cabin pressurization systems; (3) pilots’ projection while interacting with
different interfaces (B-737 vs B-777) on cabin pressurization systems; and (4) pilots’ decision-





There are 60 participants including 30 active B737 commercial pilots (21 captains and 9 flight
officers) with type flight hours between 650 and 16,000hours (M=6,902, SD=3,955); and 30
active B777 commercial pilots (17 captains and 13 flight officers) with type flight hours
between 1,000 and 13,000 hours (M=3,487, SD=3,037). Approval of the Science and
Engineering Research Ethics Committee of Cranfield University was granted in advance of
the research taking place. All participants were informed that they had the right to cease the
experiments and withdraw information they provided without any reason. The treatment of all
subjects complied with the ethical standards required by the Research Ethics Regulations of
United Kingdom.
2.2 Hypotheses
There were four null hypotheses investigated in this current research including (1) there is no
significant difference to pilots’ perception of the digital display and the pointed display of the
setting of cabin pressurization system; (2) there is no significant difference to pilots’
understanding while interacting between digital display and pointed display; (3) there is no
significant difference to pilots’ projection while interacting between digital display and pointed
display; and (4) there is no significant differences to pilots’ decision-making while interacting
between digital display and pointed display.
2.3 Apparatus
Flight Simulator: The experiments are based on B777 simulator by Canadian Aircraft
Electronics (CAE) CAE 7000 model Level D Full Flight Simulator with CAE Tropos (R)
Visual System for digital design on cabin pressurization system which is to control the interior
pressure and provide fresh air. B777 Cabin Pressurization System display is one compact
digital instrument containing all system information and is located on the Centre Instrument
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Panel between two main flight instrument panels at slightly lower than eye level (figure 1).
The B737 simulator by Thales Model Concept 2000X Level D Full Flight Simulator with
Tropos 6200 Series IG Visual System for pointed design on cabin pressurization system. The
B737 cabin pressurization system consists three needle display and the pressurization
controllers contained two automatic systems (AUTO & ALTN). If the auto system fails, the
standby system will automatically take over. The AUTO FAIL light will remain illuminated
until the mode selector is moved to STBY / ALTN (figure 2). The operating procedure of cabin
pressurization is designed to meet FAR requirements as well as maximize cabin structure
service life. The pressurization system uses a variable cabin pressure differential schedule
based on airplane cruise altitude to meet these design requirements. Malfunction is inserted at
100ft in the climb which will affect the pressurization. This may not attract crew attention
immediately as it is happening in very high workload phase. The first priority of the crew
should be to pay attention to Cabin Pressurization when pilots called for and perform the after
take-off checklist. Flight in the Terminal area involves communication and change of ATC
frequencies, adherence to original and amended clearances, monitoring flight path, other
traffic and weather. Workload is high with autopilot engaged and even more if manual flight
is performed. This is the phase of flight where changing path, automation actions and status
of aircraft systems take place.
[Figure 1 here]
[Figure 2 here]
Scenario: The scenario is comprising take-off and initial climb to deal with Cabin
Pressurization System problems which depend on several factors including how early and how
accurately the participants perceive and assess the pressurization abnormality, the participants
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may decide to divert, return to departure airport, or continue to destination using manual cabin
pressurization control. The scenario will take roughly 40 minutes in the simulator which was
recorded for further analysis on pilot’s situation awareness and the setting of Cabin
Pressurization System. After the simulator session the pilot flight (PF) will be presented with
series of snapshots of instruments and displays of the same system (digital displays vs pointed
displays) followed by five operational steps for assessing participant’s perception,
understanding and projection to the malfunction on the cabin pressurization system (table 1).
[Table 1 here]
2.4 Research Design
Pilots perform Memory Items related to Cabin Altitude Warning/Rapid Depressurization
procedures including Don Oxygen Masks, Set Regulators to 100%, Establish Crew
Communication, and Go to the Cabin Altitude Warning Checklist 2.1. The instructor monitors
and notes how aware the participants are of the Pressurization System operation, how much
time is given to assess indications and what levels of understanding is regarding the situation
around the malfunction on the cabin pressurization systems. Prior to the simulator trial, all
participants undertook the following procedures: (1) participants completed the consent form
with demographical variables including job title, qualifications, type hours and total flight
hours; (2) presented a short briefing which explained the purposes of the study and introduced
the scenario, without mentioning any potential aircraft equipment failure; (3) went through the
simulator session; (4) conducted a debrief after the flight simulator trial; (5) responded to 5
operational steps while interacting with cabin pressurization system on specific type rating
(B777 vs. B737); (6) exploring pilot’s comments to the concept of human-centered design of
the cabin pressurization displays. This experiment design is presenting participants with
snapshots of the Cabin Pressurization System indications and controls based on the type rating
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of simulator. Each group of participants was presented with the same scenario showing
Pressurization System indications for their respective aircraft type rating, followed by the pilots’
response to resolve the issues shown on digital display for B777 (figure 1) and pointed display
for B737 (figure 2).
Participants viewing the snapshots is limited to 10 seconds and the response time to those issues
is limited to 5 minutes due to the critical consequences of malfunction on the cabin
pressurization. The time allowed to the crew assessing these issues in the scenario was
recommended by Subject Matter Experts comprised of instructor pilots. There were five
operational steps of human-computer interaction with the probable failures on the cabin
pressurization systems (table 1). Instructor observing pilots’ responses to the settings of the
cabin pressurization system which reflected the pilots’ perception, understanding and projection
to the near future of operational environment. For example, the participant might respond to the
operational step-1 with the action of revolving the cabin pressure controller to manual mode to
deal with the unexpected failure. By comparing the results from parallel experiments on both
B777 and B737, it can be established which type of interface design (digital displays vs pointed
displays) is enhancing pilots’ situation awareness. Participant’s SA performance is evaluated
by his responses to the snapshots of cabin pressurization systems. The statistical analysis
applied independent t-test which is suitable to compare pilots’ situation awareness between
interacting with digital displays and pointed displays on cabin pressurization system.
3. Results and Discussions
Sixty commercial pilots (30 B737 pilots; 30 B777 pilots) participated in this research.
Participants’ demographic variables are shown at table 2. There are five operational steps to
evaluate pilot’s SA while interacted with digital display on B777 versus pointed displays on
B737. Those five operational steps including step-1 related to pilot’s perception on the setting
of cabin pressurization system, the step-2 and step-3 are reflecting pilot’s comprehension to the
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situation of indications on the cabin pressurization systems, step-4 related to pilot’s projection
(expectation) to the near future of the figures on the cabin pressurization systems, and step-5 is
reflecting to pilot’s decision-making.
[Table 2 here]
All of those five operational steps are used to evaluate participant’s perception, comprehension,
projection and decision-making regarding the setting of cabin pressurization systems on both
digital displays and pointed displays. The results demonstrated that there are significant
differences in pilots' response to step-1 “perception and action to be taken on Cabin Pressure
Controller” between pointed design (B737) and digital design (B777), t=-5.722, p<.001,
Cohen`s d=-1.482. The result shows that the first hypothesis is rejected. Pilots’ perception had
significant differences between pointed design and digital design on the cabin pressurization
system. Based on step-2 “the assessment of location of Cabin Pressurization indications”
indicated significant differences between pointed and digital design, t=-17.399, p<.001,
Cohen`s d=-4.498, and step-3 “location and display assessment” results show that there were
significant differences between pointed and digital design, t=-5.397, p<.001, Cohen`s d=-1.39.
The result demonstrated that the second hypothesis is rejected. Pilots’ understanding had
significant differences between pointed design and digital design on the cabin pressurization
system. On step-4 “projection of near future circumstances” has shown no significant
differences between pointed and digital design, t= 0.687, p>.05, Cohen's d = 0.177. The result
demonstrated that the third hypothesis is accepted. Pilots’ projection (expectation) had no
significant differences between pointed design and digital design on the cabin pressurization
system. On step-5 “action taken on Outflow valve of cabin pressurization systems” there were
significant differences between pointed and digital design, t=-4.44, p<.001, Cohen`s d =-1.139
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(table 3). The result demonstrated that the fourth hypothesis is rejected. Pilots’ situation
awareness had significant differences between pointed design and digital design on the cabin
pressurization system.
[Table 3 here]
3.1 The Location of Displays Impact on Pilot’s Situation Awareness
The complexity of the present flight deck is continuously increasing while at the same time
there is an operator on the human side of the interface with a limited capacity to cope with the
massive amount of information he/she is supposed to process. Endsley (1995b) pointed out that
research has to be encouraged to explore further the psychological components of situation
awareness with better analysis, experiments and by creating models that support and explain
the complex construct of situation awareness. Analysis of accident and incident investigation
should give important material to human factors research in establishing the role of instruments,
displays and controls on the flight deck in the reduction or break-down of situation awareness.
The results demonstrated that instrument design in the flight deck does have a significant impact
upon pilot`s situation awareness which is consistent with previous research (Endsley, 2015b).
Regarding the scenario take-off and initial climb phases, both B777 and B737 pilots had been
presented with the setting of digital displays for B777 and pointed displays for B737. The cabin
pressurization system on B737 consists of three separated indicators placed on two gauges
located on overhead instrument panel above the First Officer position (figure 3). On the other
hand, B777 Cabin Pressurization System display is one compact digital instrument containing
all the system information and is located on the Centre Instrument Panel between two main
flight instrument panels at slightly lower than eye level (figure 4). Working with advanced
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automated systems in the flight deck, pilots not only have to monitor all the displays with
efficient attention shifts, but they must also intervene if the automation systems are involved in
unexpected behaviours (Bruder, Eißfeldt, Maschke, & Hasse, 2014). The path of attention
distribution can reveal the cognitive process of human-computer interaction between human
operators and systems (Allsop & Gray, 2014; Kearney, Li, & Lin, 2016). Therefore, a pilot’s
visual scan patterns on the displays can reveal human information processes and how the
interface design impacts to performance (Goldberg & Kotval, 1999; Li, Kearney, Braithwaite,
& Lin, 2018). B-777 pilots did demonstrate higher situation awareness on the cabin
pressurization setting compared with B-737 pilots due to the location of display fitted the
principle of human-centred design.
[Figure 3 here]
[Figure 4 here]
3.2 Interface Design affecting Pilots’ Perception
The results from this study have demonstrated significant differences in instrument assessment
and subsequent actions between pilot groups. B737 pilots did not have the correct assessment
of the system status from the Step-1, 4 and 5 and as a consequence they undertook incorrect
actions. Therefore, this reveals a significant absence of situation awareness on all three levels.
By contrast B777 pilots have been correct in assessing the pressurization system status in the
Step-1 and 5 and as a consequence their actions have been appropriate demonstrating a high
level of situation awareness. There are 70% of B-737 pilots on step-1 whose response was to
set cabin pressure controller to “Manual”. There are 56.6% of pilots who opted for “Cabin Rate
to decrease” on step-4, though there are no significant difference on the pilots’ expectations
between pointed design and digital design (table 3). On step-5, 60% of pilots opted for the
response “Setting to ‘Close’ Cabin Pressure will return to normal”. B-737 pilots’ perception
that the system status was controllable in Manual mode was an incorrect assumption. They were
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incorrect to choose to close the outflow valve, as the valve has already been closed by the
malfunction.
Pilots expected cabin pressure to “Decrease” as a result of previous actions which is an incorrect
expectation as the cabin rate is not controlled by cabin pressure controller. The previous
research has indicated that knowledge-based visual processes (top-down) play a critical role in
modulating attention capture and guidance (Nikolic, Orr, & Sarter, 2004). Pilots’ perception in
the flight deck can also be attracted promptly and adjusted properly depending on features of
the stimulus (Blair, Watson, Walshe, & Maj, 2009), which is based on the bottom-up visual
characteristics. Therefore, it is critical that unexpected malfunction stimulus stirs a pilot’s
perception to make attention shifts rapidly and correctly to the suitable displays in order to make
urgent responses. According to pilots’ response to step-1, B-737 pilots’ responses demonstrated
less precise perception to Cabin Pressure Controller than B-777 pilots. The digital design on
the cabin pressurization system integrated all the critical information to facilitate pilots’
attentional distribution for the searching of information. It reveals that digital display design on
B-777 attracts pilots’ attention better than pointed display design on the B-737. The location of
the overhead panel also requires head positioning away from primary flight displays. Flying
and navigating tasks have overall priority over system assessment tasks, so diverting attention
to the overhead panel during take-off operation is routinely excluded or minimized. Design of
the Outflow Valve Indicator features a small needle and a very small size instrument, probably
the smallest of all indicators in this B-737 flight deck. This design does not provide saliency of
information and, as the experiment has shown, the crew have very high workload in order to
process this information as initial perception of the system status.
3.3 Interface Design Impacted to Pilots’ Understanding
The purpose of cockpit interface design is to contribute to a better understanding of pilot’s
cognitive mechanisms involved in data-driven attention distribution and situation awareness.
16
The statistical analysis had shown that pilots’comprehension level of Step-2 (assess the location
of Cabin Pressurization Indications) and Step-3 (the location of Cabin Pressurization
Indications affecting operation) between B-737 and B-777 groups have significant differences.
It revealed that Cabin Pressurization Indications (digital display) on B-777 can assist pilots and
enable them to easily grasp the real time situation on cabin pressure failure. It is consistent with
previous visual behavior research that the comprehensive interface design can shorten saccadic
distance to increase operators’ attentional shifts and situation awareness (Yu, Wang, Li,
Braithwaite, & Greaves, 2016).
There are 83.3% of the B-777 pilots who expressed no issue on assessing both auto and manual
modes on the cabin pressurization system, and there is a significant correct response when
compared to that of the B-737 pilots. On the “expected effects in terms of figures?”, there are
80% of B-777 pilots who opted for dealing with “Cabin Rate to decrease” which is the correct
understanding of the current situation. The result demonstrated that digitalization on the flight
deck can significantly improve pilot’s understanding the current situation on the cabin
pressurization systems. The Proximity Compatibility Principle (Wickens & Carswell, 1995)
can be used to explain B-777 pilot’s better understanding of cabin pressurization setting than
B-737 pilots, as the relevant information has to be integrated on a cluttered display and be
placed in close spatial proximity which can improve operator’s performance. In addition, B-
777’s Cabin Pressurization Indications could probably reduce diverting attention from primary
tasking due to the integration of information from converging indicators. The interface design
of digital display on B-777 supports pilots’ situational awareness without causing other
detrimental effects (Harrivel et al, 2016). The main instrument of Cabin Altitude and
Differential Pressure Indicator with two needles and two gauges are confusing to B-737 pilots
when interpreting the setting on the cabin pressurization, and is also lacking salient information
to assess critical situations quickly. During the high workload phase of take-off and the initial
climb, it is a demanding task to assess which needle is related to which scale again leading to
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errors in the comprehension phase of situation awareness.
3.4 Interface Design Influencing Pilots’ Projection
There are 56.6% of B-737 pilots who provided negative feedback to the location of cabin
pressurization and 70% expressed their concern with regard to the location of cabin
pressurization affecting their operational efficiency. What B-737 pilots’ feedback indicates is
that the position of the pressurization system display might be an important factor affecting
their situation awareness performance, for the position of B-737 cabin pressurization is on the
top of right-hand seat where it is not easy for the pilots to observe. On the other side, B-777
pilots had the same scenario with the same setting values of indications on their cabin
pressurization displays. There are three stages of information processing involved in pilots’
decision-making, these are cue perception, diagnosis, and choice (Wickens & Hollands, 2000).
It indicates that the features of the cabin displays can influence the quality of pilots‘ decision-
making starting with the presentation of the failure cues in order to attract the pilot’s attention ,
understanding what cues are relevant to what issues, forming multiple options and projecting
the proper corrective intervention to resolve the malfunction. The results of Step-5, indicated
that B-777 interface design might help the pilot determine the correct control input a great deal.
After take-off the pilot has to re-configure the airplane (landing gear and flaps), fly the airplane
(manually or with autopilot), navigate, communicate and monitor other traffic. Monitoring the
system status is not his priority at this event. These five steps are sufficient to reproduce the
operational settings of cabin pressurization systems regarding take-off and climbing without
memory decay, as found by Endsley (1995b).
Pilots’ responses to all situtations were focused on their evaluation of what was the appropriate
setting presented on instruments, displays and control panels. This has been accomplished by
comparing pilot`s responses to suitable instrument indications to reflect the status of aircraft.
The comparison of actual indications and the perceived situation has provided an objective
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measure of situation awareness.The better human centered integrated design on the cabin
pressurization is the type on B-777. It is located in the centre of the instrument display
accessible to both pilots without diverting attention from primary flight instruments. The
display contains quality information, already processed by the system, thus reducing the pilot’s
cognitive workload to process those information. Colour coding is used to indicate the status of
cabin pressure system; pictorial presentation of relevant information is available at a glance,
and information of highest importance is given visual priority grabbing the focused attention
(Ltifi, Kolski, & Ben Ayed, 2015).
4. Conclusion and Recommendation
The purpose of this study is to explore the impacts of instrument design with regard to pilot’s
situation awareness. By applying flight simulator scenarios to this research, it is applicable to
approach pilots’ perception, comprehension and projection to the setting of cabin pressurization
systems. The results have shown significant differences on pilots’ situation awareness between
digital display and pointed display on the flight deck. The B737 Cabin Pressurization System
and associated controls has lacked some of the basic important principles of human-centered
design. The location of five elements of the system (three instruments and two controls) on the
overhead panels has not followed the proximity compatibility principle. Perceptual proximity
solution (position of two sources conveying the task-related information) and processing
proximity (defining how the sources have to be integrated in task performance) have not been
applied in the design of these system indications compared with B-777 digital display. The B-
777 display design is consistent with the Proximity Compatibility Principle in both spatial (all
relevant indications on one single integrated display) and processing proximity (the integration
of sources related to the task). The position of the display on the centre instrument panel, does
not require dramatically changing head position and is accessible to both pilots. The position of
the digital design on the cabin pressurization system makes this information available even
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when attention is mainly allocated to the flying task. There are some recommendations on the
cabin pressurization design based on this research as following, (1) all indications should be
located on one panel to be accessible to both pilots; (2) size of outflow valve position indicator
should be significantly increased to provided saliency of information; (3) colour coding should
be used on cabin altitude and differential pressure indicator to mark critical cabin altitude; (4)
standard operating procedures shall include cabin altitude and differential pressure reading by
pilot monitoring. The final and completed solution to the issues on the cabin pressurization
system is to redesign the scattered pointed displays as integrated digital displays to fit the
human-centred principle and located at the centre of flight deck.
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Figure 1. Illustrated cabin pressurization malfunction of Boeing 777 during take-off and initial climb
operation
Figure 2. Illustrated cabin pressurization malfunction of Boeing 737 during take-off and initial climb
operation
27
Figure 3. The position of B-737 cabin pressurization on the top of right-hand seat in the flight deck
shown as red circle
Figure 4. The position of B-777 cabin pressurization in the center of flight deck shown as red circle
Table 1. Five operational steps related to human-computer interaction on the malfunction of cabin
pressurization system
28
Table 2: Participants' qualifications and flight hours of Boeing 737 and Boeing 777
Steps Content
1 What action would you take on cabin pressure controller?
2 How do you assess the location of Cabin Pressurization Indications based on the
significance of the effect?
3 How is the location of Cabin Pressurization Indications affecting its operation based
on the significance of the effect?
4 What effect you expect in terms of figures on the displays?



























































M SD M SD t df p SE Cohen's d
Step-1 Perception 1.50 0.82 2.67 0.76 -5.722 58 <.001 0.204 -1.482
Step-2
Comprehension
1.60 0.86 4.87 0.57 -17.399 50.59 <.001 0.188 -4.498
Step-3 1.50 0.94 2.93 1.11 -5.397 56.39 <.001 0.266 -1.39
Step-4 Projection
Decision-making
1.97 0.67 1.87 0.43 0.687 58 .495 0.146 0.177
Step-5 1.77 0.97 2.73 0.69 -4.44 52.39 <.001 0.218 -1.139
